

CHALLENGES IN UAS: Design for Autonomy and Integration into the National Airspace

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Motivation - Rationale



- □ The importance of autonomy
- □ Integrate UAVs into the National Airspace System
- UAVs must function as if there were a pilot on-board
- UAVs must demonstrate ELOS comparable to those of manned aviation
- UAVs must have on-board sense-and-avoid/see-and-avoid systems
- UAVs must have failure recovery capabilities that go beyond the nominal/backup control system
- Goal: Manned unmanned aviation flying / sharing the same airspace
 - Unmanned formations
 - Manned unmanned formations
 - □ Mid-air collision avoidance






Fortune - "An estimated 30,000 commercial and civil drones could be in the skies in the U.S. by 2020, according to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) estimates that between 2015 and 2025, the drone industry will create 100,000 jobs and contribute \$82 billion to the U.S. economy."





Circulation Control Part I

Integration into NAS



Picture is taken from: https://www.nasa.gov



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NNED SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITU

There is Nothing "Unmanned" in UAS






Figure 4-1 Manning Unmanned Platforms is a Key Staffing Problem

Objective: 4-1 ratio to become 1-4, that is, one operator, 4 UAS. Human-in-the-loop (U.S. Air Force) Human-on-the-loop (U.S. Army)



There is Nothing "Unmanned" in UAS





MQ-9 Reaper AVOs

- Must design effective / efficient HMIs to reduce AVO workload.
- Requires automation progression decision making shifts to the 'machine'
- High confidence systems
- Challenge: Quest for autonomy
- → iff (if and only if) the above is 'accepted', and if the roadmap to integration into the NAS is 'developed', then, UAS will be fully integrated into the national



FAA regulations for UAS operating in the NAS state that they must provide an "...equivalent level of safety comparable to see-andavoid aerial requirements for manned aircraft". They should function 'as if there were a pilot on-board'!!!

The challenge:

"Design and build UAS that comply with VFR and later IFR requirements"

- Compliance with requirements pertaining to:
- See and avoid
- Right-of-way rules
- □ ATC communication
- □ Airspace classes
- □ NOTAMs





- Use "Redundancy" to increase safety
- As such:
 - See-and-avoid
 - Sense-and-avoid


functioning as one system and also independently

Quote from FAA Rep: "This is A NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT CONDITION"




Motivation - Rationale





•Evasion flight path depends on the flight characteristics of the threat aircraft(s)



In the U.S. the first to fly will be UAVs with MTOW < 25 pounds Must demonstrate ELOS comparable to those of manned aviation (FAA) Must operate "as if there were a pilot on-board"




Sample of Applications



- Power line inspection
- Pipeline inspection
- Fire detection
- Traffic monitoring
- Ship inspection
- Search and rescue
- Aerial photography
- SWAT support
- Imaging and mapping
- ISR
- Chemical spraying

- Hazard monitoring
- Mine inspection
- Dam inspection
- Watering restriction support
- Border patrol
- Police surveillance
- Harbor patrol
- Earth quake inspection
- Crop dusting
- Night vision
- Anomaly detection/prevention





<u>Traffic monitoring:</u> Framework for incorporating real-time data in simulation models





Traffic Monitoring -1 Traffic Monitoring - 2 Autotracking Multiple Monitoring Algorithm Works - Race1 Algorithm Works - Race2 Fire Detection - 2 (With fixed-wing UAV) Formation - Ellipse Formation: UGV - Helicopter Landing Platform Hovering to land Circulation Control



















DOD ROADMAP - AUTONOMY







The Challenge of Autonomy (U.S. DoD)






Figure 1-1 Framework for the Design and Evaluation of Autonomous Systems



The Challenge of Autonomy (U.S. DoD)



Missed Opportunities, Needed Technology Developments





Figure 1-3 Status of Technology Deployment and Remaining Challenges



(Our) Proposed Architecture








(Our) Proposed Architecture







(Example) Helicopter Maneuvers



Basic Maneuvers (Basic navigation)

- Take-off/Landing
- Forward Flight
- Hovering
- Turns and side slips
- Taxiing
- Departure flight (reverse)
- Waypoint navigation

Aggressive Maneuvers (acrobatics)

- Flips
- Loops
- Autorotation landing
- Avoidance



http://www.dynamicflight.com/flight_maneuvers/takeoffs/





Figure 9-15. Rectangular course. The numbered positions in the text refer to the numbers in this illustration



http://www.modelairplanenews.com/blog/2012/10/02/master-the-cuban-8/

Thus, controller design <u>IS</u> a challenge



Helicopter Failure Scenarios




• Possible failure scenarios:

- Total engine failure
- Sensor failures
- Controller failure
- Structural failure

To make system fail-safe:

- Separate navigational and stabilization sensors
- Install a servo multiplexer that can be taken over by an RC system and controlled by a remote human pilot
- Include stabilization control modes in case of navigation sensor failures, such as attitude, altitude hold control
- Include an autorotation landing controller in case of total engine failure to land aircraft
- <u>Running</u> Landing
- Tail <u>Failure</u>
- Autorotation





(Example) Fixed-Wing Flight Maneuvers





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
- Straight lines
- Turns
- Loops
- Rolls (line/barrel/snap)
- Knife's edge





Cooperative / Formation Flight

- Multiple UAVs coordinated either through a higher level supervisory / centralized controller or following a leader vehicle
- Other techniques include using potential fields or behavior-based approaches



Source: <u>danshope</u>





Framework for Controller Design






Fig. 1 This block diagram illustrates the helicopter controller design problem. The helicopter dynamics can be represented by a linear or nonlinear system of differential equations. In either case, the feedback control law depends on the model choice.



Helicopter Control/Dynamics Challenges



- Open-loop unstable (Planes fly, helicopters crash!)
 - E.g.: Hovering is open loop unstable
- High degree of coupling
 - Control channels have high interdependence
- Nonlinear behavior




- Underactuated nonlinear system (fewer control inputs compared to system variables)
- Linearization works in small regions
- Dynamics spanning wide range of frequencies
 - 6 DoF rigid body model; forces created by controlled/uncontrolled aerodynamics and gravity;
 Significant coupling between aerodynamic forces and moments
- Fast dynamics
 - High sampling freq. and processing speed required
- Obtaining accurate models amenable for control design
 - System identification procedures are lengthy and specialized personnel is required.
- Diverse sources of noise and disturbances
 - Lower grade sensors due to payload limitations; Wind; Rotor wake; Mechanical vibrations

But....because of their advantages over fixed-wing UAVs, they are preferred for civilian/public domain applications, and also certain military applications.




TYPICAL HELICOPTER CONTROLLER





- Inner-loop
 - Stabilizes unstable plant.
 - Partial decoupling of control channels.
 - Generates four low level commands; longitudinal and lateral cyclic, collective, and pedal.
 - High bandwidth
- Outer-loop
 - Generates set points for inner-loop.
 - External set points: inertial frame position (x, y, z) and heading (ψ).



Most typical helicopter control architectures separate dynamics into inner attitude control and outer translational control. A third loop is added for navigational control.



Rotor Fuselage gusts gusts rotor forces cyclic controls rotorcraft Rotor Angular Translational velocity dynamics dynamics dynamics rotor moments thrust direction effect of rotorcraft angular motion on rotor motion

effect of rotorcraft translational motion on rotor motion

Figure: Block diagram of the longitudinal-lateral helicopter control problem. Illustration of the cross coupling effect in the torque and force generation.

Rotorcraft state vector



- The resulting equations are found to depend on a number of parameters, including:
 - rigid body variables $(u, v, w, p, q, r, \phi, \theta, \psi)$
 - main rotor flapping dynamics $(a_0, a_1, b_1, \dot{a_0}, \dot{a_1}, \dot{b_1})$
 - Pitt-Peters inflow dynamics $(\lambda_0, \lambda_s, \lambda_c)$, stabilizer bar dynamics $(a_s, b_s, \dot{a_s}, \dot{b_s})$
 - actuator dynamics $(\theta_{lon}, \dot{\theta}_{lon}, \theta_{lat}, \dot{\theta}_{lat}, \theta_{col}, \dot{\theta}_{col}, \theta_{ped}, \dot{\theta}_{ped})^{[13]}$
- Full state vector:

 $\boldsymbol{x} = \begin{bmatrix} u \ v \ w \ p \ q \ r \ \phi \ \theta \ \psi \ a_0 \ a_1 \ b_1 \ \dot{a}_0 \ \dot{a}_1 \ \dot{b}_1 \ \lambda_0 \ \lambda_s \ \lambda_c \ a_{1_s} \ b_{1_s} \ \dot{a}_{1_s} \ \dot{b}_{1_s} \ \theta_{\text{lon}} \ \dot{\theta}_{\text{lon}} \ \theta_{\text{lat}} \ \dot{\theta}_{\text{col}} \ \dot{\theta}_{\text{col}} \ \theta_{\text{tr}} \ \dot{\theta}_{\text{tr}} \end{bmatrix}^{\text{T}}$

• For most applications, and consideration of simplifications, derivatives and inflow dynamics are ignored.



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• Linear Models

- Require a number of assumptions in order to linearize dynamics
- Usually valid for a particular set of operating conditions
- Works for simple maneuvers and non-aggressive flight (hover, forward flight, etc.)
- Allow for simplified control approaches

Nonlinear Models

- More difficult to implement
- Valid for larger range of operating conditions
- Allow for more complex maneuvers and aggressive flight (Loops, etc.)
- Control efforts are more robust

• Model Free

- Requires numerous flight tests
- Employs learning algorithms to teach control system to perform various maneuvers through analysis of piloted flight data
- Control restricted to particular aircraft and flight conditions

Flight Dynamics Modeling




 $\dot{x} = Ax + Bu$

y = Cx + Du

 $f(x, u, y, \dot{x}, \dot{u}, \dot{y}, ...) = 0$










Handling Nonlinearity through Linearization and Gain Scheduling









- Non-aggressive flight
 - Configuration space: change position in 3D and heading (R³xS¹).
 - Two regimes considered:
 - Hovering (includes slow motion).
 - Forward Flight.
 - Decomposition:
 - Outer loop: guidance
 - Velocity, position commands
 - Inner loop: control
 - Decoupling
 - Stabilization

Input	Output
Lateral Cyclic Longitudinal Cyclic	Position in horizontal plane
Collective	Altitude
Pedal	Yaw



Inner/Outer Loop Decomposition






Considerations


Decentralized Control

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Simplifying assumption: coupling is treated as a disturbance with linear MIMO system treated as multiple SISO systems



Fully coupled MIMO system



Helicopter control with SISO subsystems




PID Controllers




Time-domain equation for the PID controller with K_p the proportional gain, K_l the integral gain, and K_D the derivative gain

$$e(t) = r(t) - y(t)$$
$$u(t) = K_P * e(t) + K_I * \int e(t)dt + K_D * \frac{de(t)}{dt}$$

- The derivative term of a PID controller produces to suddenly changing signals
- to avoid an undesirable sharp response the derivative term is moved from the closed loop forward path.
- If derivative term is measurable, this output is used directly rather than implementing differentiator.








Rate feedback PID control



PID Control Revisited



- Two degree of freedom controllers with anti-windup
- Tuning
 - Basic stabilization with complete plant: four proportional controllers.
 - Reduce input/output channel dynamics including cross couplings.
 - Iterate procedure on other channels.






PD-like Fuzzy Logic Controller



- The error e(t) is defined as the difference between the desired signal value (set point) and the real value of the controlled variable
- $\Delta e(t)$ is the error change.
- S_e is the scaling factor for the error, e(t).
- S_{ce} is the scaling factor for the change of the error, $\Delta e(t)$.
- S_u is the scaling factor of the PD-like controller's output..






PID-like Fuzzy Logic Controller




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- S_{ce} is the scaling factor for the change of the error, $\Delta e(t)$.
- S₁ and S₂ are the output scaling factors of the PI-like and PD-like controller that constitute the fuzzy PID-like controller.





LQG Control Strategy








Outer-Loop Control Design



- Inner-loop reduction
- Outer loop handled by 4 PID controllers and a correction block for trajectory input.



• PID controllers can be designed by SISO approximation using classical control techniques.




LQG control with integrator for tracking

- Plant augmented with integrators
- Separation principle
 - Kalman filter design
 - LQR gain design
- Full support of Computer Aided Control System Design (CACSD) tools: MATLAB










MPC Control Position Tracking System






where:
$$\mathbf{T}_{i}^{b} = \begin{bmatrix} c \theta c \psi & c \theta s \psi & -s \theta \\ s \phi s \theta c \psi - c \phi s \psi & s \phi s \theta s \psi + c \phi c \psi & s \phi c \theta \\ c \phi s \theta c \psi + s \phi s \psi & c \phi s \theta s \psi - s \phi c \psi & c \phi c \theta \end{bmatrix}$$
 and $\mathbf{T}_{b}^{i} = (\mathbf{T}_{i}^{b})^{T}$











Backstepping Approach Derive Helicopter Model

Rigid body dynamics, External Wrench model, complete rigid body dynamics Translational Error Dynamics Attitude Error Dynamics Yaw, Orientation error dynamics Angular Velocity Error Dynamics Stability of the Attitude error dynamics Stability of the Translational error dynamics





Pure feedback form

41

The controller requires that the equation describing the system dynamics could assume the following form:

$$\dot{x} = f(x) + g(x)\xi_{1}$$

$$\dot{\xi}_{1} = f_{1}(x, \xi_{1}, \xi_{2})$$

$$\dot{\xi}_{2} = f_{2}(x, \xi_{1}, \xi_{2}, \xi_{3})$$

$$\vdots$$

$$\dot{\xi}_{k-1} = f_{k-1}(x, \xi_{1}, ..., \xi_{k})$$

$$\dot{\xi}_{k} = f_{k}(x, \xi_{1}, ..., \xi_{k}, u).$$

- $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and ξ_k states
- f_i (*i*=1,...,*k*) nonlinear function
- f_i depends only on ξ_j (j=1,...,i+1)



Concepts of backstepping controller - II



Nonlinear recursive control

Each differential equation is considered as a subsystem to be controlled, its control is the state of the upper order equation. The external input *u* controls in cascade the all system.



Why a backstepping controller



Problems with traditional (linear) UAV control techniques:

• Highly nonlinear behavior.

a proper control law uses natural nonlinearities to stabilize the system

• Unmodeled system dynamics.

inclusion of dynamics contained in the nonlinear terms

• Robustness to parametric uncertainties and external disturbances.

inclusion in the control of nonlinear damping terms to improve robustness

• Coupling between longitudinal and latero-directional planes.


└→ inclusion of nonlinear coupling terms

The main strength of backstepping is the ability to deal with nonlinearities.



Equations of Motion

Set of 12 nonlinear equations describing the dynamics of any aircraft (rotary or fixed wing) [1].




[1] I.A. Raptis and K.P. Valavanis, 'Linear and Nonlinear Control of Small-Scale Unmanned Helicopters', Springer, 2010 ICUAS Tutorial on Navigation and Control



States:



Helicopter: equations of motion are already in cascade form





The rotorcraft controller design problem has been tackled!

Integrated control + diagnostics has been studied NMPC+ANN design for vertical autorotation (post-failure)

Sense-and-avoid/see-and-avoid systems to be integrated with the FCS.

Next step: Complete implementation and testing.



Summary of Control Approaches



FCS Type	Algorithm	Pros	Cons	Maneuvers
Linear	PID (SISO)	Easily ImplementedAssumes simplified decoupled dynamicsGains can be tuned in flight	Lacks robustnessIgnores coupling of dynamics	Mostly hovered flight Attitude/Altitude control Lateral/Longitudinal control
	LQR/LQG	 Can be used to stabilize outer/inner loop dynamics 	Limited to certain flight conditionsGain calculation is an iterative process	Hovering, trajectory tracking
	H-∞	 Can cope with parametric uncertainty and un-modeled dynamics Loop shaping 	 Higher level of mathematical understanding and computation Need a reasonably good system model 	Hover, trajectory tracking
	Gain scheduling	 Switching between a family of linear controllers to be used to cover a larger range of operating conditions 	 Higher computation requirements and storage of controller gains Need to determine parameters used in decision making 	Hover, trajectory tracking, backflip (quadrotor)
Non- linear	Back stepping	• Well known technique for under actuated systems	 Need exact knowledge of nonlinear functions 	Trajectory tracking, autorotation landing
	Feedback Linearization	 Nonlinear transformations techniques transforms variable to a new coordinate system where dynamics are linear 	 Higher computational complexity Transformed variables and actual output may differ greatly 	Auto take-off, landing, hovering, aggressive maneuvers
	Adaptive	 Robust technique that can handle un- modeled dynamics and parametric uncertainty 	Complex analysisVarious approachesNeed decent knowledge of system	Formation flight, vision based navigation
	Model Predictive Control	Can handle multivariable controlTracking errors can be minimized	 Prediction model must be formulated correctly 	Target tracking,
Learning Based	Neural Networks	 Models can be identified offline or online Can be combined with standard techniques 	Need to train the networkCan increase the order of the controller	Hovering, autorotation, etc.
	Fuzzy Logic	Able to execute basic flight behaviors	 Need to train the system and develop accurate rules 	Hovering, forward flight, climbing turns
	Human Based Learning	 Learns from human pilot execution of maneuvers 	Requires both modeling and flight data	Aggressive maneuvers
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Controller Performance



• Hover and cruise:

• Has been shown to be achievable with all controller types

• Tracking

 Necessary and sufficient to define desired position trajectory and heading for control purposes


• Improved flight envelope

- Combine various control schemes (PID, LQR, MPC, NN, ...) in order to improve robustness and flight envelope.
- Use of Fuzzy networks, NN, or learning algorithms to switch between control strategies in order to create smooth control action transitions.
- Account for actuator saturation to ensure stability and performance.




Proposed Overall Control Architecture














Challenge: Timing and synchronization



Helicopter FCS Framework











Requirements



• "The system must be equal to or better than the theoretical see and avoid capability of a human pilot"

Field of Regard				
Source	Azimuth	Elevation		
Int'l Standards, Rules of the Air,	+/- 110°	No guidance		
Section 3.2.2.4 (ICAO)				
ACC/DR-UAV SMO				
Sense and Avoid Requirement for	+/- 110°	+/- 15°		
Remotely Operated Aircraft (ROA)	- /-110			
25 June 2004				
American Standards for Testing	./ 440%	+/- 15°		
and Materials (ASTM) 2411.04	+/- 110°			
U.S. DoD Standardization	./ 440°	1/ 4E°		
Program Office	+/- 110°	+/- 15°		

• Detection range dependent on vehicle cruising speed.



Why Radar?



- In addition to optical systems our radar system offers:
 - Lower computational requirements for detection and identification
 - Immunity to sunlight and other common light sources
 - Less affected by "optical clutter" (Clouds, Dust, glass, etc...)
 - Multimode operation:
 - Range detection, Doppler sensing, SAR mapping, Data Communication, etc...
 - Does not require inter-vehicle cooperation as is the case with other systems (TCAS, PCAS, FLARM)




Signal Origins



$$\Delta F = F\left(\frac{2\nu}{c-\nu}\right)$$

F = Transmit frequency (10.5GHz) c = Speed of light v = Object velocity ΔF = Doppler shifted frequency


 $\Delta F = 70.048\nu$



http://withfriendship.com/images/b/9240/Doppler-effect-pic.jpg



Target Detection (Walking Human)






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Target Detection (Walking Human)





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Origin of Complex Signatures: Helicopter






$$Helicopter_Spectrum(T) = \left(\frac{2F}{c}\right) \left[\frac{\pi d_{mr}}{T} + \frac{\pi d_p}{T} + \frac{\pi d_{tr}}{T/4.24} + Aux(T)\right]$$

- d = Component diameter
- T = Rotational period of main rotor
- F = RADAR transmit frequency (10.5GHz)
- c = Speed of light




Experimental Setup





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
Technical Details: Rotorcraft Sig





Processing Algorithms









UAV	Evasion	Detection	Safety	Other
	Region	Region	Region	Air Traffic

• Evasion scenario divided into range "shells"

```
    Evasion – Determined by opposing aircraft
dimensions and UAV's acceleration
    Detection Region – Determined by threat Radar Cross
Section
    Safety region – "N" multiple of the combined evasion
and detection regions
```

• All regions affected by the combined vehicle velocities.



Uniqueness




- Other devices address larger vehicles, and the associated high acquisition costs hinder widespread implementation
- Furthermore, commercially available, miniature airborne radar systems do NOT address the air to air collision scenario. There are, however, systems for the following:
 - SAR Mapping
 - Radar Altimetry / range finding
- Our system is capable of addressing the above scenarios IN ADDITION to air-air collision mitigation





Accidents and damages








Fig. 5.2: Fatality rates from general aviation, commuter and air carrier accidents as a function of time. Based on analysis of NTSB accident data [15] between 1983 and 2006.



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


Fig. 5.4: The probability of fatality as a function of kinetic energy impact as estimated by Weibel [20] and models derived in RCC321 [18] and RCC323 [17].








Fig. 5.5: The probability of fatality as a function of kinetic energy impact for the proposed model with $\alpha = 10^{6}$ J, $\beta = 100$ J and for several values of p_s . For comparison purposes the estimates of Weibel [20] as well as the models of RCC321 [18] and RCC323 [17] are given.






Table 5.12: The percentage of the US area over which each UAS can loiter without violating set TLS requirement, based on exhibited reliability. The bold column represents the reliability of manned general aviation. Population density data: [1].

	T_{GI} in hr				
	10^{2}	10 ³	10^{4}	10^{5}	10^{6}
RQ-4A Global Hawk	0.4%	7.1%	38.8%	79.5%	96.6%
MQ1 Predator	2.5%	25.6%	64.2%	93.8%	99.0%
RQ-2 Pioneer	14.7%	52.9%	90.3%	98.3%	100.0%
Neptune	43.8%	83.9%	97.2%	99.9%	100.0%
Aerosonde	53.2%	90.4%	98.3%	100.0%	100.0%
RQ-6 Fire Scout	7.7%	40.8%	81.4%	96.8%	99.8%
Guardian	32.7%	72.4%	95.5%	99.5%	100.0%
Rmax type IIG	55.9%	91.5%	98.5%	100.0%	100.0%
Vario XLV	79.1%	96.5%	99.7%	100.0%	100.0%
Maxi Joker	89.4%	98.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%




Case Study % of US – Flying over





(a) RQ-4A Global Hawk



(b) MQ-1 Predator



Fig. 5.6: The areas of the US, the RQ-4A Global Hawk and the MQ-1 Predator UAS are allowed to loiter over based on their reliability with respect to ground impact occurrence frequency.



(a) Yamaha Rmax IIG



(b) Maxi Joker 2




Fig. 5.8: The areas of the US, the Yamaha Rmax IIG and Maxi Joker 2 helicopters are allowed to loiter over based on their reliability with respect to ground impact occurrence frequency.



Case Study % of Europe- Flying over






(a) RQ-4A Global Hawk




(b) MQ-1 Predator



Fig. 5.9: The areas of Europe, the RQ-4A Global Hawk and the MQ-1 Predator UAS are allowed to loiter over based on their reliability with respect to ground impact occurrence frequency.






Acceptable T_{GI} in hours to overfly corresponding area				
$< 10^{2}$	$10^2 - 10^3$	103 104	$10^4 - 10^5$	$> 10^{5}$

Fig. 5.11: The areas of Europe, the Yamaha Rmax IIG and Maxi Joker 2 helicopters are allowed to loiter over based on their reliability with respect to ground impact occurrence frequency.











THE PROPOSED SYSTEM







THE 'AUGMENTED' SYSTEM FOR MANNED HELICOPTERS





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IDEA Presentation, 2016



UC²AV:Unmanned Circulation Control Aerial Vehicle for Short Takeoff and Enhanced Payload



Konstantinos Kanistras, Pranith C. Saka, Kimon P. Valavanis and Matthew J. Rutherford



Research Goals



Focus on <u>designing</u>, <u>modeling</u>, <u>developing</u> and <u>experimentally validating</u> <u>and verifying</u> through wind tunnel and flight testing Circulation Control Wings (CCWs) for unmanned aircraft, which will allow for **lift enhancement**, resulting in:

Increased payload capability

- ✓ More sensors on-board
- ✓ Additional payload (more cargo, fuel, etc.) that allows for mission flexibility

Reduced takeoff / landing runway distance

- ✓ Less infrastructure required
- ✓ Smoother landings


□ Increased stall angle and reduced V_{stall}

- ✓ Allow for lower velocity over areas of interest
- ✓ Increase maneuverability



What is important in the UAV industry?





UC²AV Tasks





Specifications:

- MTOW : 4.7 kg / 10.8 Lbs
- Ground Speed: 19.5 m/s
- Max Speed: 20-23 m/s

Weight Specifications:

- Wing: 1780 g / 3.90 Lbs
- Tail & Booms: 340 g / 0.75 Lbs
- Fuselage: 1840 g / 4.05 Lbs
- Batteries: 940 g / 2.10 Lbs






Research Achievement

The GC2 AV is integrated with a Circulation Control system that:

The UC²AV achieved a <u>takeoff runway distance reduction</u> up to **53.8%** using up to **53.8%** using up to **53.8%** using the parts of the




Circulation Control : Off Flaps Deflection : 30 degrees Take off Distance : 117m/ 383ft

Circulation Control : On Flaps Deflection : 30 degrees Take off Distance : 54m / 117ft



Research Timeline






The Road Ahead



Prepare for the new era of NAS operations

- Develop experimentally proven and reliable technology
- □ Address safety issues through technology
 - Design and build stable controllers with fault tolerance
 - □ Enhance onboard intelligence to overcome issues with lost comm links
 - Design emergency systems to protect the public in the event of catastrophic failures.
 - Enhance vision systems and alternative sensors to provide true see-and-avoid capability

□ Obtain FAA experimental (and later on full) certification









The Road Ahead



See and Avoid Technology

□ Use of latest estimation tools to provide adequate information even under very strict size, weight and power limits.

- □ Focus on full trajectory estimation of detected targets (v.s. position only)
- Definition of appropriate metrics to determine performance
- Full proof-of-concept demonstration in accurate simulation environment
 Integration with guidance, navigation and control algorithms to provide efficient "avoid" capability







The Road Ahead



Safety Technology

□ Full control architectures that incorporate:

- □ Robustness (all weather design)
- □ Intelligent path planning with provisions for lost comm links
- Redundancy
- Health monitoring
- Reconfigurable control algorithms

Emergency systems for safe flight termination

- □ Same robust design to allow recovery under any conditions
- □ Minimal requirements to provide adequate performance under the
- strictest size, weight and power limitations.

□ Focus on public safety v.s. aircraft integrity It is better to lose a UAS than risk an injury





